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Germany’s two-year membership in the UN Security Council ended on 31 December
2020. Starting with big expectations, it hit the hard realities of increasingly divisive
world politics in times of a global pandemic. Nevertheless, Germany can point to
some notable successes.
Every eight years, Germany applies for a non-permanent membership in the Security
Council. The recent term was the sixth time that Germany sat on the Council. It had
applied with an ambitious program: strengthening the women, peace and security
agenda; putting the link between climate change and security squarely on the
Council’s agenda; strengthening the humanitarian system; and lastly, revitalizing the
issue of disarmament and arms control. It chose those four thematic issues to make
its mark, besides the Council’s day-to-day business dealing with country situations.
Has Germany been successful?
Everyday business in a divided Security Council
If Germany proudly points to “over 100 resolutions” that were adopted over the
past two years, this should be put into context. In 2019, the Council adopted 52
resolutions, the lowest number of resolutions in six years, and a total of 67 decisions
(resolutions and presidential statements), the lowest number in 18 years. 2020 saw
another decline in Presidential Statements, and compared to 2019, the Council
adopted only three more decisions in 2020. Moreover, the vast majority of those over
100 resolutions are on recurring country situations.
For some years now, non-permanent members have increasingly been admitted
to “penholdership”, i.e. primary responsibility for drafting with regard to specific
conflict-related situations. Germany took over (co-)penholdership for the country
situations in Afghanistan (with Indonesia), Libya (on sanctions with the UK, including
chairmanship of the Libya sanctions committee), Sudan/Darfur (with the UK), and
humanitarian issues in Syria (with Belgium and Kuwait in 2019). None of them
proved an easy feat. The annual renewal of the UN Mission in Afghanistan in 2019
found itself deadlocked. China threatened a veto over the question on whether
or not to retain prior language that explicitly welcomed China’s Belt and Road
Initiative. Also in 2019, resolutions drafted by Germany (with Belgium and Kuwait)
on a ceasefire in Idlib, Syria, were vetoed, as was the extension of the cross-
border/cross-line aid delivery mechanism in December 2019. Eventually, two border
crossings were re-authorized at the eleventh hour in January 2020. However, in July
2020, this was reduced to only one border crossing, after protracted negotiations
and several vetoes cast by Russia and China. In Libya, fighting resumed just weeks
after Germany had hosted a conference on the stalled Libyan peace negotiations in
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Berlin. A ceasefire was ultimately reached in October 2020, with a roadmap towards
elections in December 2021, but the peace remains fragile.
Some success at the country-level: the transition in Sudan
Perhaps one of Germany’s biggest achievements in terms of specific country-
situations was the Security Council’s only new peacekeeping operation in 2020: the
UN Integrated Transitional Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). It was mandated in early
June 2020 to support the transition process in Sudan, including constitution-making
assistance and support for Sudan’s National Plan for Civilian Protection. Sudan
has been a high priority on Germany’s foreign policy agenda since the toppling of
Omar Al-Bashir in 2019.  As co-penholder on Darfur, Germany also objected to
an immediate withdrawal of the Darfur Mission, UNAMID, and instead advocated
for a smoother transition between UNAMID and UNITAMS. This transition is now
provided for in resolution 2524. It is certainly no coincidence that António Guterres
named a German national, Volker Perthes, as his Special Representative and Head
of UNITAMS.
2019: A year of big expectations
Media attention for the United Nations was generally low throughout 2020 – despite
the world organization celebrating its 75th birthday in October. This stands in stark
contrast with Germany’s first few months on the Council. These were marked by
high-level political presence in New York, generating considerable media attention
as well. 2019 was kicked off by the Dominican Republic, a first-time non-permanent
member of the Security Council. Each month, the Presidency rotates in alphabetical
order, and the country holding the Presidency – in particular non-permanent
members – typically hold so-called signature events on a topic that they consider a
priority. The Dominican Republic’s signature event on the impact of climate-related
disasters on international peace and security aligned well with Germany’s emphasis
on climate change as a topic for the Security Council and was attended by Foreign
Minister Heiko Maas, the first of his several visits to the Security Council in 2019.
Maas also attended an informal, Arria-formula meeting on Women, Peace and
Security in the Middle East, co-organized with the United Kingdom and Peru, one
day prior. Women, Peace and Security was to be the focus of Germany’s Presidency
in April 2019.
French-German unity in the Council
The German Presidency itself was part of a broader effort to project European
unity in the Council: in January 2019, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron had
signed the French-German Aachen Treaty, in which the two countries committed to
“coordinat[ing] their positions [within the United Nations] closely, including as part of
wider efforts to coordinate the positions of the Member States of the European Union
that are also members of the United Nations Security Council” (Article 8 (1)). As part
of this effort, France and Germany used their successive Council presidencies in
March and April 2019 to present themselves as a “jumelage”, with a joint Programme
of Work – a first in the history of the Council. Germany organized two high-level
events regarding women’s rights and participation during its 2019 Presidency: first,
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an open debate on the role of women in peacekeeping, chaired by the then German
Minister of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen (another first; no German defense
minister had ever chaired a Security Council meeting before), and second, a debate
on sexual violence in conflict.
Women, peace and security – one step forward, two steps back?
The debate on sexual violence in conflict drew a lot of attention, from civil society
and the media, both domestically and abroad. Prominent, high-level briefers had
been invited. Noble peace prize winners Nadia Murad and Denis Mukwege and
human rights lawyer Amal Clooney joined the UN Secretary-General, the SG’s
Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, and Inas
Miloud of Libya, nominated to represent civil society by the NGO Working Group
on Women, Peace and Security, as briefers. Heiko Maas had put a spotlight on
the open debate and planned resolution on sexual violence in conflict through an
opinion piece in the Washington Post, co-authored with Angelina Jolie, a few days
prior. Resolution 2467 itself, however, almost failed, due to objections not only by
Russia and China (who ultimately abstained), but also due to the United States. The
US threatened to veto the resolution due to language on reproductive rights and
health. As a result, the entire paragraph on access to reproductive rights and health
services was deleted from the final draft. Several civil society organizations had
warned against precisely such an outcome arguing that such an ambitious resolution
was bound to fail in view of the Trump administration’s stance on this language.
The legal implications of the pushback on language regarding sexual and
reproductive rights and health cannot be treated exhaustively here. Still, a few
observations are in order. No resolution on the Women, Peace and Security agenda,
including resolution 2467, is adopted under Chapter VII. This is the case for almost
all thematic resolutions (with the noteworthy and much discussed exceptions of
resolutions 1325 and 1540). While member states might only accept as legally
binding upon them resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, so-called “Chapter VI”-
resolutions can contain legally binding provisions at least for the UN system, and
arguably also for member states. For example, such resolutions may create working
groups or other subsidiary bodies, or impose reporting duties. More importantly,
however, thematic agendas, once established, will be referenced in Chapter VII-
resolutions and thus find entry into the realm of the Council’s legal activity. The
Council’s thematic agendas – on women, peace and security; on children and armed
conflict; on the protection of civilians – have all become “operationalized”, i.e. are
now routinely referenced and made part of Security Council mandates. UNITAMS,
the transitional mission in Sudan, is a good example in this regard.
It is in this light that the German effort to strengthen the Women, Peace and Security
agenda has to be appraised. One important question is how the different resolutions
on a thematic agenda item relate to one another: does the absence of prior agreed
language signify that resolutions are rescinded in that regard? Christine Chinkin and
Madeleine Rees have argued that the Council explicitly reaffirms “its commitment
to the continuing and full implementation” of all prior resolutions on women, peace
and security, notably including resolutions 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013), both of
which contain the contentious language on sexual and reproductive rights and
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health, and that therefore, despite the explicit objection to prior agreed language,
these resolutions were by no means rescinded. At the same time, one might argue
that in explicitly rejecting prior agreed language, member states (in this case the
United States) objected to any legally binding force. However, this argument would
probably only hold for those states who explicitly objected to the language, not for
e.g. peacekeeping missions with a mandate to implement the women, peace and
security agenda. In any event, it is up to the actors in the international legal order
to make their legal position on this matter clear: as I have argued elsewhere, the
decentralized nature of the international legal order makes it particularly important for
states to adopt clear legal stances.
2020: Efforts in the shadow of the global pandemic
In hindsight, the extensive debate on whether resolution 2467 was progress or rather
a step back pales against the challenges faced in 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic
swept the world. As early as in March, Secretary-General António Guterres called
for a global ceasefire in light of the pandemic. It took the Security Council more
than three months to take up this call: it adopted resolution 2532 on 1 July, the
first day of the German Presidency in 2020, demanding a “general and immediate
cessation of hostilities in all situations on its agenda”. Germany’s Presidency in July
2020 comprised an equal number of high-level, prominently attended meetings (via
videoconference) as the 2019 Presidency. Germany held open debates on peace
operations and human rights, chaired by current German defense minister Annegret
Kramp-Karrenbauer, who followed in her predecessor’s footsteps; on women, peace
and security with Angelina Jolie as briefer; and on climate and security, presided
over by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. But absent any formal outcome of these
meetings, these meetings remained largely inconsequential. A modest success
was achieved on the issue of climate and security: the open debate resulted in the
creation of an informal expert working group on the topic, which held its inaugural
meeting in November 2020. Whether the informal working group will succeed in
placing the topic of climate and security more prominently on the Council’s agenda,
given objections from several members of the Council that climate is not primarily a
security issue, remains to be seen.
Towards more leadership on the international plane?
A clear-cut assessment of Germany’s two-year term on the Security Council
appears impossible: global politics were too exceptional, the circumstances too
unique – perhaps. At the same time, it is precisely the Council’s task to deal with
exceptional circumstances of global politics. Over the past two years, this has
become increasingly difficult. The Council is divided on many issues, be they
country-specific or thematic. Germany took a clear stance on many controversial
issues and was more upfront than in the past. One might argue that this increases
divisiveness, instead of diminishing it. At the same time, it also signals a willingness
to take on leadership and responsibility, a quality that has been found lacking in prior
German participation in multilateral fora. It remains to be hoped that such an attitude
gets translated also into increased support at an operational level for the UN’s work
– both in the Council and beyond.
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